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Corporate Insolvency Law in the 21st Century: 
State-Imposed or Market-Based? 
Michael Schillig* 
 
Abstract: The central premise of this article is that financial innovation and the ever-
increasing complexity of proprietary entitlements necessitate a principled recalibration 
of the boundaries of regulation and contract in corporate insolvency law, a recalibration 
that is already under way. Through the lens of a combination of ‘commons/anti-commons 
analysis’ and ‘contractualisation of bankruptcy’ models, the article critically analyses 
recent developments at European and national level, in particular the development and 
reform of the concept of Centre of Main Interest (COMI), the rise of pre-packaged 
administrations and the reformulation of the anti-deprivation principle. The adopted 
theoretical framework explains and justifies these developments and provides some 
guidance for future reform efforts. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the publication of the Cork Report1 more than 30 years ago, corporate insolvency 
law has flourished as a subject of academic enquiry. Initially perceived as a rather 
technical area, of relevance mainly to practitioners, the interest in a theoretical and 
                                                 
* School of Law, King’s College London. A draft of this paper was first presented at the INSOL Europe 
Academic Forum conference in Venice, September 2011. I would like to thank Rolef de Weijs, Roger 
Brownsword and Robin Parsons for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1 Report of the Review Committee, Insolvency Law and Practice (Cmnd. 8558) (Cork Report). 
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principled analysis of the complex policy issues involved has increased significantly.2 
With the enactment of the European Insolvency Regulation (EUIR)3 corporate insolvency 
law in Europe has effectively become a multilayered system,4 a tendency that is likely to 
increase. The ongoing global financial crisis has further sharpened the focus.5 Major 
reform efforts are either under way or have already been implemented.6 In the context of 
                                                 
2 R Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (London: , Sweet & Maxwell, 4th edn 2011) para 1-01; 
V Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (Cambridge: CUP, 2nd end 2009) chapter 
2; RJ Mokal, Corporate Insolvency Law: Theory and Application (Oxford: OUP 2005). 
3  Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings OJ L160/1 
30.06.2000. 
4 The EUIR is a conflict of laws instrument containing mainly rules on jurisdiction, the applicable law and 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions. However, it also contains provisions of a substantive 
nature, eg Art 7(2) EUIR. 
5 R Bork, Rescuing Companies in England and Germany (Oxford: OUP 2012) para. 1.12. 
6 At national level: Banking Act 2009, providing a special resolution regime for commercial banks in 
financial distress; Investment Bank Special Administration Regulations (SI 2011/245); The Insolvency 
Service, Proposals for a Restructuring Moratorium – a consultation (July 2010). 
At EU level: Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a 
framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms, COM(2012) 280/3; 
European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs – Legal Affairs, Harmonisation of Insolvency Law at EU Level (2010); European 
Parliament – Committee on Legal Affairs, Report with recommendations to the Commission on insolvency 
proceedings in the context of EU company law (October 2010); Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on insolvency 
proceedings COM(2012) 744 final (Commission Proposal); Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee: A new European 
approach to business failure and insolvency COM(2012) 742 final. 
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recent developments at European and national level, this article focuses on the 
relationship and fault lines of mandatory, state-imposed regulation and contractual, 
market based solutions in the realm of corporate insolvency law. Corporate insolvency 
law is in many respects dependent upon, and interwoven with, contractual arrangements.  
In a world without debt, insolvency would be impossible and in a market economy most 
debt will have been created contractually. Where a company is in financial distress it may 
reorganise its capital structure on the basis of an informal workout involving a 
contractual adjustment of existing claims. A Company Voluntary Arrangement is also 
contractual in nature, although the contract has a statutory overlay.7 And secured credit 
modifies the secured creditor’s status in the debtor’s insolvency. The formal procedures, 
however, subject to which a debtor is either reorganised or liquidated when insolvent on a 
cash flow or balance sheet basis are state-imposed and largely mandatory in nature. In 
principle, it is not possible for debtors and creditors to opt out of corporate insolvency 
law, to modify the applicable procedure or to devise their own customised procedure in, 
and for, a situation in which the statutory regime has been triggered.8 The central premise 
of this article is that financial innovation and the ever increasing complexity of capital 
structures necessitate a recalibration of the fault lines between regulation and contract in 
corporate insolvency. Such a recalibration is already under way at both European and 
                                                 
7 Insolvency Act 1986, ss 5(2)(b) and 6; Goode (n 2) para 12-26. 
8 For the US Bankruptcy Code, 11 USC §§541(c)(1), 545, 365, 363(l) reflecting the ipso facto principle; for 
the UK anti-deprivation rule and the pari passu principle Goode (n 2) para 7-01 – 7.12; for Germany L 
Häsemeyer, Insolvenzrecht (Heidelberg: Carl Heymans Verlag, 4th edn 2007) para 2.02: insolvency 
proceedings as ‘suspension of private autonomy’; see also Bork (n 5) para 7.04. 
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national levels. The article offers a theoretical justification and critical analysis of these 
developments. 
It first explains the existence and structure of a mandatory corporate insolvency 
law on the basis of a combination of a ‘tragedy of the commons’ and ‘anti-commons’ 
analysis. 9  In the absence of corporate insolvency law, the creditors faced with an 
insolvent debtor find themselves in a common pool situation. Each creditor has an 
incentive to enforce his individual property rights as soon as possible, to the detriment of 
a potential going concern surplus – ‘fishing the pond empty’.10 This can be remedied by 
imposing a comprehensive moratorium on individual enforcement rights and locking all 
creditors into a collective procedure. Where each locked-in creditor has a veto-right on 
the realisation and distribution of a potential surplus, a tragedy of the anti-commons may 
ensue: strategic bargaining and hold ups may thwart an outcome that would be beneficial 
to all creditors as a group. This problem may be addressed through information rights, 
majority voting in classes and cram down provisions. However, financial innovation 
resulting in increased fragmentation and fluidity of debt as well as increased complexity 
of property rights and distorted incentives of rights holders amplifies the anti-commons 
problem. The traditional mechanisms increasingly appear to be inadequate. 
One possible solution consists of the ex ante or ex post re-pricing of property 
rights so as to make cooperation more attractive. This may be achieved, contractually, 
                                                 
9 For the first comprehensive assessment of corporate insolvency law in these terms see R de Weijs, 
‘Harmonisation of European Insolvency Law and the Need to Tackle Two Common Problems: Common 
Pool & Anticommons’ Centre for the Study of European Contract Law Working Paper No. 2011-16. 
10 T Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986) 
12. 
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through a ‘menu approach’ to bankruptcy11 that allows the debtor company to select the 
optimal bankruptcy regime ex ante in its corporate charter from a range of different 
bankruptcy options (ex ante re-pricing). A subsequent change in the applicable 
bankruptcy law through charter amendment (ex post re-prising), is complex and requires 
the adequate protection of non-consenting parties. This theoretical framework can be 
used to analyse the concept of the Centre of Main Interest and its subsequent change 
(insolvency forum shopping) under the EUIR;12 and supports some concrete suggestions 
relevant for the current reform debate. 
The ‘anti-commons’ problem resulting from forcing creditors into a collective 
procedure to act as one unit (‘collectivisation’) may further be resolved by a switch 
(back) to ‘privatization’, that is, bundling the individual enforcement rights of creditors in 
the hands of a single rights holder or lead creditor. The ‘contract bankruptcy approach’ is 
based on the notion that parties contract ex ante in the lending agreement for the debtor to 
make the optimal bankruptcy choice ex post when in financial distress. This can be 
achieved by ‘bribing’ the firm to make that optimal choice by allowing it to keep an 
optimal percentage of the firm’s insolvency monetary return. This approach establishes a 
mechanism for a switch from collectivisation to privatisation and vice versa. As such, it 
provides the bankruptcy-theoretical justification for the rise of pre-packaged 
                                                 
11 Throughout this article the term ‘bankruptcy’ is to be understood in the US-American sense of the term 
(and not in the sense of Part IX of the Insolvency Act 1986). 
12 Art 3(1) EUIR. 
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administrations in the UK, 13  as well as strong arguments for the introduction of a 
restructuring moratorium as envisaged by the Insolvency Service. 
A more limited solution the commons/anti-commons dilemmas may be found in 
the insulation and separation of those creditors who are willing to cooperate from non-
cooperating creditors. This may take the form of a partial privatisation or opt-out of the 
mandatory bankruptcy process by some creditors. The ‘waiver contract approach’ 
elaborates a standard for assessing under what circumstances such a partial 
privatisation/opt-out should be enforceable from an ex ante point of view. It provides a 
theoretical justification and basis for refinement of the test developed by the UK Supreme 
Court for determining a breach of the anti-deprivation principle in the context of complex 
financial contracts14. 
The final section offers some concluding remarks on the redefinition of the 
boundaries between contract and regulation. 
 
B. THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS/ANTI-COMMONS ANALYSIS  
OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY 
 
                                                 
13 J Armour, ‘The Rise of the “Pre-Pack”: Corporate Restructuring in the UK and Proposals for Reform’ in 
RP Austin and FJG Aoun (eds.) Restructuring Companies in Troubled Times: Director and Creditor 
Perspectives (Sydney: Ross Parsons Centre, 2012) 43 (also available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2093134; 
in the following, references will be to this electronic copy). 
14 Belmont Park Investments PTY Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd and Lehman Brothers Special 
Financing Inc [2011] UKSC 38. 
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The most prominent justification for the existence of a mandatory and collective 
corporate insolvency regime has been presented by Thomas Jackson in form of the 
‘creditors’ bargain theory’.15 The ‘creditors’ bargain’ is a hypothetical model which is 
designed to mirror the agreement one would expect the creditors as self-interested 
rational agents to form among themselves were they able to negotiate such an agreement 
from an ex ante position.16 Jackson views the situations of creditors in the absence of 
prior agreement as a ‘classic example’ of a ‘prisoners’ dilemma’: Each creditor, unless 
assured of the other’s cooperation, has an incentive to take advantage of individual 
collection remedies, and to do so before the other creditors act. These creditors would 
favour the existence of a government-imposed system of collective debt enforcement 
because this would eliminate the costs associated with a race of the creditors on the 
company’s assets.17 According to Jackson, this race not only creates (monitoring) costs 
for the individual creditor, it is also likely to lead to a premature termination of the 
debtor’s business since each creditor will consider only that creditor’s own advantage 
                                                 
15 T. Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain’, (1982) 91 Yale 
Law Journal 857; Jackson (n 10) 7 – 19. 
16 Jackson (1982) (n 15) 858. 
17 ibid 861. Secured creditors are unlikely to profit directly from these cost savings. However, Jackson 
argues, because the collective regime minimizes the debtor’s total credit costs to the advantage of debtor 
and unsecured creditors one would expect the unsecured creditors to pay the secured creditors to agree to 
join in the collective proceeding; ibid 869. In order to maintain the (assumed) efficiency gains of secured 
credit secured creditors are still required to be paid first out of the secured creditor’s collateral. 
Consequently, secured creditors would not be worse off by joining a collective proceeding and the 
unsecured creditors could be made better off; ibid 870. 
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from racing, not the disadvantages imposed on creditors collectively.18 To the extent that 
maintaining the debtor’s business as a going concern is likely to increase the aggregate 
pool of assets, the introduction of a collective enforcement regime is advantageous to the 
creditors as a group.19 
At the heart of this approach is a ‘tragedy of the commons’.20 On the basis of their 
individual enforcement rights, creditors have access to a scarce resource in form of the 
debtor’s assets. When the debtor is insolvent, the creditors’ incentives are misaligned in 
the sense that the exercise of any one creditor’s individual enforcement right (in priority 
to others) may result in a fully internalised benefit for that creditor – full satisfaction of 
his claim – whereas the costs emanating from the destruction of the going concern value 
are externalised and borne by all the other creditors as a group. Even if there is no going 
concern value inherent in the debtor’s assets, individual enforcement action may still 
result in negative externalities in the sense that the other creditors may only receive a 
lower dividend as compared to a pari passu sharing in the debtor’s assets. Thus, because 
they do not take into account all the implications of their individual enforcement action, 
creditors as a group will be worse off.21 The misalignment of incentives is a result of the 
combination of individual enforcement rights with a common pool of assets.  Individual 
rights can be used to offload costs on the common pool whilst at the same time the 
                                                 
18 ibid 862. 
19 ibid 865. For a critical assessment see R. Mokal, ‘The Authentic Consent Model: contractarianism, 
Creditors’ Bargain, and corporate liquidation’, (2001) 21 Legal Studies 400. 
20 de Weijs (n 9) 2-3. 
21  LA Fennell, ‘Commons, anticommons, semicommons’ in K Ayotte and H Smith (eds) Research 
Handbook on the Economics of Property Law (Edward Elgar, 2011) 35, 36. 
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common pool can be accessed in order to obtain private benefits.22 This ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ can be addressed by reducing the degree of mismatch between the individual 
rights and the common pool through delinking individual rights from the right of access 
to the common pool and by either consolidating individual rights in the hands of a single 
rights holder (‘privatisation’) or in the hands of a collectivity that can act as one 
(‘collectivisation’).23 In the context of corporate insolvency, administrative receivership 
is an example for privatisation. A single creditor with a security over all or substantially 
all of the debtor’s assets can appoint a receiver to control the common pool for the benefit 
of the appointing creditor. 24  Junior creditors are prevented from exercising their 
individual enforcement rights against the debtor’s assets in the possession of the 
receiver.25 By contrast, collectivisation can be observed with administration where an 
administrator is appointed – by the court or out-of-court26 – with far-reaching powers 
over the debtor’s assets27 and a duty to act in the best interest of all creditors.28 Individual 
enforcement rights are transformed, subjected to a comprehensive moratorium 29  and 
                                                 
22 ibid 37. 
23 ibid 38-39. 
24 Goode (n 2) para 10-06 – 10-24. 
25 Evans v Rival Granite Quarries Ltd [1910] 2 KB 979; see also Insolvency Act 1986, s 43. 
26 Insolvency Act 1986, Schedule B1 para 10, 14, 22. 
27 Insolvency Act 1986, Schedule B1, para 59 -64 and 70-72, and Schedule 1. 
28 Insolvency Act 1986, Schedule B1 para 3(2). See also Goode (n 2) para 11-93. 
29 Insolvency Act 1986, Schedule B1 para 42, 43. 
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reduced to a right to participate in the creditors’ meeting and to vote on the 
administrator’s proposals.30 
This is, of course, not the end of the matter. Neither privatization nor 
collectivisation remove the mismatch of individual rights and common pool completely; 
rather, a new interface between privately and commonly owned elements will appear and 
generate costs of its own.31 Privatization may result in a mismatch of procedural power 
and substantive entitlement. In administrative receivership, where the secured creditor’s 
claim has a nominal value of less than the market value of the collateral, he will lack the 
incentive to maximise returns.32 Where a piecemeal sale of the debtor’s assets generates 
sufficient proceeds to satisfy the secured lender’s claim and to pay the receiver’s fees and 
costs, the latter has no incentive to preserve any going concern value by continuing 
trading and selling the business as a going concern, even if the overall returns would be 
higher for the benefit of all creditors.33 To that extent, the ‘tragedy of the commons’ will 
not be averted.   
                                                 
30 Insolvency Act 1986, Schedule B1 para 50 – 53. 
31 Fennell (n 21) 39. 
32 The Insolvency Service, A Review of Company Rescue and Business Reconstruction Mechanisms – 
Report by the Review Committee (May 2000) para 49. 
33 Armour (n 13) 4. See also K Ayotte and E Morrison, ‘Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11’ 
(2009) 1 Journal of Legal Analysis 511, 532, arguing, on the basis of empirical evidence, that a Chapter 11 
case is more likely to result in a sale of assets, rather than a traditional reorganisation, where senior secured 
creditors are over-secured.  
 11 
In case of collectivisation, the ‘tragedy of the commons’ may be transformed into 
a ‘tragedy of the anti-commons’.34 There is a multitude of interactions between commons 
and anti-commons problems and their delineation is not entirely clear.35 At a very basic 
level, whereas the commons problem may be said to derive from too many private access 
rights or ‘use privileges’ resulting in ‘over-use’ of a common resource, anti-commons is 
characterised by private exclusion or veto rights resulting in ‘under-use’ of a common 
resource.36 However, on that basis, commons and anti-commons may be viewed as just 
different sides of the same coin. The pre-bankruptcy situation of creditors may be 
analysed, in accordance with the ‘creditors’ bargain approach’, as a commons problem: 
Too many individual enforcement rights resulting in a premature liquidation of the debtor 
company and over-use of the common pool – ‘fishing the pond empty’.37 However, since, 
in the absence of a general moratorium, every creditor’s consent would be required to 
effectuate a workout, and every creditor would have to credibly commit to not enforcing 
his individual rights, 38  by vetoing a workout for strategic reasons a possible going 
concern value may be lost, thus under-using the common pool due to the exercise of veto 
rights. The key for a proper understanding of the distinction seems to lie in the different 
                                                 
34 de Weijs (n 9) 5-7; DG Baird and RK Rasmussen, ‘Anti-Bankruptcy’ (2010) 120 Yale Law Journal 648, 
652-653. 
35 Fennell (n 21) 42-43. 
36 M Heller, ‘The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets’ (1998) 
111 Harvard Law Review 621, 677. 
37 Jackson (n 10) 12. 
38 J Armour and Simon Deakin, ‘Norms in Private Insolvency: The “London Approach” to the resolution of 
Financial Distress” (2001) 1 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 21 – 51. 
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strategic behaviour patterns of commons and anti-commons.39 The commons problem 
resembles the strategic pattern of a Prisoner’s Dilemma with one dominant strategy and 
one Nash equilibrium: in the absence of a credible commitment by the other creditors to 
cooperate, every creditor is always better off by enforcing his individual rights (or by not 
cooperating in a workout) because by cooperating (not enforcing) he will never realise 
more than he could by enforcing (full satisfaction) and will lose out if the others don’t 
cooperate which a rational actor will anticipate.40 This applies regardless of whether one 
focuses on the individual access rights or exclusion rights. 
                                                 
39 Fennell (n 21) 43. 
40 The respective payoff bimatrix could look as follows: 
The debtor’s assets have a break up value of 8 and a 
going concern value of 12. Each of two creditors 
has a claim against the debtor of nominal 7. 
Creditor 2 
Enforce (don’t 
cooperate) 
Don’t enforce 
(cooperate) 
 
Creditor 1 
Enforce (don’t 
cooperate) 
4; 4 7; 1 
Don’t enforce 
(cooperate) 
1; 7 6; 6 
The socially optimal outcome would be the realization of the going concern value through cooperation 
(non-enforcement of individual rights). The creditors as a whole would be better off and the amount of 12 
could, for instance, be split equally (bottom right). In the absence of mandatory corporate insolvency law it 
may not be possible for either creditor to credibly commit to cooperation. In that case, each creditor will 
always be better off when he enforces (does not cooperate) regardless of what the other creditor does. 
Under the assumption that each creditor has an equal chance of coming first in the race on the debtor’s 
assets, the payoff for each creditor would be 4 (50% x 7 + 50% x 1). By contrast, each creditor will have a 
payoff of only 1 when he cooperates and the other enforces, realizing a payoff of 7. Thus, the dominant 
strategy of each creditor is to enforce (not cooperate); the Nash equilibrium is represented by the top left 
 13 
By contrast, the anti-commons problem is more akin to the ‘game of chicken’ 
with multiple equilibria and no dominant strategy where the best strategy for each 
individual player depends on what the other does.41 A state imposed general moratorium 
solves the commons problem by overriding individual enforcement rights, thus 
preserving the potential going concern value inherent in the common pool. Parties must 
then decide how to realise and distribute a potential surplus. Each party has an incentive 
to extract as much of the surplus for itself as possible. However, by misreading the other 
party’s intentions or by being in error of the amount of surplus, a party may push too far, 
a deal may collapse and the surplus may be lost.42 In particular, where a party finds itself 
                                                                                                                                                 
corner. DG Baird, RH Gertner and RC Picker, Game Theory and the Law (Harvard University Press, 1994) 
33-34.  
41 Fennell (n 21) 43-45; Baird, Gertner and Picker (n 40) 44-45. See also R de Weijs, ‘Too Big Too Fail as 
a Game of Chicken with the State: What Insolvency Law Theory has to say about TBTF and vice versa’, 
Centre for the Study of European Contract Law Working Paper Series No. 2012-13. 
42 Fennell (n 21) 44-45. On that basis the example above fn 40 can be modified. The creditors are now 
locked in a mandatory corporate insolvency law process, preventing them from exercising individual 
enforcement rights and temporarily preserving the common pool of assets. The creditors still have to decide 
how to distribute the going concern surplus. If 
they don’t reach agreement the going concern 
surplus will be lost and they will share the break up 
value on a pro rata basis. 
Creditor 2 
Don’t cooperate 
 
Cooperate 
 
Creditor 1 
 
Don’t cooperate 
 
4; 4 7; 5 
Cooperate 
 
5; 7 6; 6 
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in a monopoly position and its contribution would significantly increase the surplus, it 
has great incentive to hold out and demand a higher than proportionate price for 
cooperation. 43  Corporate insolvency law addresses these issues through information 
rights, possibly channelled through a creditors’ committee,44 majority voting instead of 
unanimity45 and possibly a cram-down in order to overcome holdouts.46 
                                                                                                                                                 
The socially optimal outcome is represented by the bottom right corner where the creditors equally share 
the going concern value of 12. However, each creditor has an incentive to hold out in order to extract a 
share of the surplus that exceeds what would be due to him on a pro rata basis. Thus, where creditor 2 holds 
out and creditor 1 is willing to forgo some of the surplus in order to reach agreement the payoffs may look 
like in the bottom left corner with creditor 2 receiving a payoff of 7 and creditor 1 of 5 (or vice versa: top 
right). Creditor 1 may be willing to cooperate because his payoff in that case still exceeds his payoff were 
the agreement to fail and both creditors would share equally in the break up value (top left corner). In this 
game there are multiple Nash equilibria and each creditor’s optimal strategy depends on what the other 
does. Baird, Gertner and Picker (n 40) 44. 
43 Fennell (n 21) 42. 
44 Insolvency Act 1986, Schedule B1 para 49 with Insolvency Rules 1986 r 2.33: having acquired the 
necessary information about the debtor company’s financial situation, the administrator shall make a 
statement setting out proposals for achieving the purpose of administration and its termination to be send to 
every creditor and member of the company and also the registrar of companies. Pursuant to Insolvency Act 
1986, Schedule B1 para 57, the creditors’ meeting may establish a creditors’ committee that may require 
the administrator to provide information about the exercise of his functions. 
45 In administration, the creditors’ meeting decides in principle with the simple majority on the basis of the 
nominal value of the unsecured creditors’ claims, Insolvency Rules 1986, r 2.43. Where the administrator’s 
proposal consist of a company voluntary arrangement, a (in excess of) 75% majority applies, Insolvency 
Rules 1986, r 1.19(1). In case of a scheme of arrangement in respect of each class of creditors a simple 
majority in number and 75% majority in value is required, Companies Act 2006, s 899.  
 15 
At the heart of the matter is the fact that markets are not perfect, generating 
substantial transaction costs, information asymmetries and ambiguities about the property 
rights of the parties. Debtors and creditors cannot costlessly monitor, renegotiate and 
enforce their agreements.47 Strategic behaviour – free riding and hold up situations – may 
prevent creditors and debtors from reaching agreement that would maximize firm value 
for the benefit of all parties concerned. Mandatory corporate insolvency law is a reaction 
to these market failures addressing both commons and anti-commons dilemmas.48 By 
preventing a race of the creditors on the debtor’s assets corporate insolvency law seeks to 
maximise the aggregate return for all creditors. The potentially ensuing surplus is 
distributed amongst creditors on the basis of a fair and equitable system of priority of 
claims and majority voting. 
This mandatory regime – in its different manifestations – is premised on the 
general assumption that on the whole (unsecured creditors) have an economic interest in 
the maximization of the value of the debtor company’s assets.49 The participants are 
identifiable and their respective property rights are sufficiently well defined. However, 
this general assumption seems to have lost some of its plausibility. The ‘derivatives 
                                                                                                                                                 
46 Whereas the rights of dissenting secured creditors may not be overridden in administration or under a 
company voluntary arrangement, a cram down of the rights of secured creditors is possible in a scheme of 
arrangement subject to court approval, Insolvency Act 1986, s 4(5), Schedule B1 para 73(1); Companies 
Act 2006, s 899. Goode (n 2) para 12-13. 
47 E Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World’, (1993) 92 Michigan Law Review 336, 
379. 
48 de Weijs (n 9) 2. 
49 Baird and Rasmussen (n 34) 654. 
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revolution’, technological innovation and the development of equity and debt trading 
techniques allows equity und debt investors as well as directors and executives to 
rearrange and modify their property rights by de-coupling and reassembling economic 
interests and control rights, resulting in increased complexity and fragmentation of 
proprietary interests. 50  This is apparent from the exponential growth of the credit 
derivatives market.51 A creditor may hedge its exposure to the default risk of the debtor 
by holding a ‘credit default swap’ (CDS). Under a simple CDS, if a ‘credit event’52 
occurs the protection seller will compensate the protection buyer based on the difference 
between the nominal value of the credit instrument and its market value shortly after the 
credit event.53 During the swap term the protection buyer typically pays the seller a fixed 
                                                 
50 HTC Hu and B Black, ‘The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden Ownership’ (2006) 79 
Southern California Law Review 811; ‘Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and 
Extensions’ (2008) 156 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 635; ‘Debt, Equity, and Hybrid 
Decoupling: Governance and Systemic Risk Implications’ (2008a) 14 European Financial Management 
663. 
51 By the end of June 2011 the total notional amount of outstanding credit default swaps was more than $32 
trillion, Bank for International Settlements, OTC derivatives market activity in the first half of 2011 
(November 2011) 15. Prior to the Global Financial Crisis the market had already doubled in size between 
2006 and 2007, reaching $29 trillion. E Avgouleas, Governance of Global Financial Markets (CUP, 2012) 
48. 
52 “Credit event” may be the opening of formal insolvency proceedings, payment default or an informal 
workout. 
53 Under the CDS the protection buyer will be entitled to payment even if he does not hold and never held 
the underlying credit instrument. In this respect a CDS differs from a contract for insurance which in most 
cases will only provide protection if the insured holds an insurable interest. 
 17 
periodic amount. Although fully hedged through the CDS, the protection buyer retains all 
contractual rights under the credit instrument and may exercise, dispose of, waive or 
renegotiate these rights and vote on an administrator’s proposal, a CVA or a scheme of 
arrangement.54  Through securitisation, via ‘collateralised debt obligations’ (CDOs), a 
pool of debt contracts or instruments is transferred from the originator to a special 
purpose vehicle (SPV).55 The returns from the pool are repackaged into separate tranches 
based on difference in credit quality. The SPV issues financial instruments backed by the 
underlying debt contracts or swaps to be sold off to investors. Under these structures the 
contractual control rights may remain with the originator or may lie with the SPV. The 
holders of the tranches will be exposed to the economic interest, but only partially since 
the SPV’s portfolio will usually be highly diversified.56 Not only may the economic 
interests of tranches differ widely, CDO investors may be fully or partly hedged and 
spread throughout the world. This, in combination with actively trading their positions, 
will make the identification of the holders of the ultimate economic interest very 
difficult.57 With the emergence of hedge funds and private equity groups as important 
players, replacing in some areas traditional commercial banks as sources of capital, 
                                                 
54 Hu and Black (2008a) (n 50) 679-680; F Partnoy and D Skeel, ‘The Promise and Perils of Credit 
Derivatives’ (2007) 75 University of Cincinnati Law Review, 1019, 1021-1022. 
55  In a ‘cash CDO’ a portfolio of outstanding debt is actually transferred to the SPV; whereas in a 
‘synthetic’ CDO the SPV creates synthetic exposure to credit risk by entering into a series of credit default 
swaps with a third party; Hu and Black (2008a) (n 50) 686; Partnoy and Skeel (n 54) 1022. 
56 Hu and Black (2008a) (n 50) 686-687. 
57 ibid 687. 
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trading in distressed debt has become more and more prevalent.58 These funds are largely 
unregulated and unconcerned with adverse publicity. They often invest by using highly 
leveraged and complex financial arrangements in order to increase their returns. 59 
Distressed debt trading allows the small and undiversified debt holder an easy exit from 
the corporate insolvency process; the investor in distressed debt will seek to realise a 
premium on its investment by exploiting superior knowledge about the debtor company 
or the insolvency process, by trying to gain control of the debtor or simply by trying to 
extract a higher than proportionate return in negotiations over the restructuring of the 
debtor. 60  In any case, traders in distressed debt and CDO investors have their own 
agendas which do not necessarily coincide with a successful corporate rescue of the 
debtor’s business. Moreover, the use of credit derivatives may even result in a creditor’s 
economic interest being negative so that he may profit from a premature liquidation and 
may actively encourage it.61  
These developments amplify the significance of the ‘tragedy of the anti-
commons’. The heightened complexity through debt fragmentation and de-coupling, the 
resulting realignment of incentive structures as well as the appearance of new and opaque 
players make it more difficult to correctly identify and assess the incentives of the other 
players and calculate their behaviour in a scenario where there is no dominant strategy.62 
                                                 
58 Baird and Rasmussen (n 34) 659. 
59 Finch (n 2) 135-136. 
60 Baird and Rasmussen (n 34) 661. 
61 Hu and Black (2008a) (n 50) 693-694. 
62 Fennell (n 21) 45; Armour (n 13) 14: ‘The greater the number of parties involved in such negotiations, 
and the wider their range of interests, the more difficult it will be to achieve agreement.’ 
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This increases the likelihood that any one party will hold out and push too far so that a 
surplus enhancing deal may collapse. The resulting deadlock perpetuates the tragedy. The 
ensuing anti-commons problem interposes itself between the initial commons problem 
(‘creditors’ bargain’) and its solution through collectivisation. 63  By imposing a 
comprehensive moratorium, creditors are no longer able to exercise their individual 
enforcement rights, thus preserving the common pool. At the same time the participants 
are locked in an anti-commons situation with their individual property rights transformed, 
re-defined and priced in a particular way.   
There seem to be (at least) three possible ways to alleviate these problems. First, 
the property rights of the participants locked in the anti-commons situation could be 
redefined thereby re-pricing the choice between cooperation and defection.64 Re-pricing 
                                                 
63 Fennell (n 21) 46. 
64 ibid 45. It is possible to modify our example above fn 40 by redefining the creditors’ property rights in 
the anti-commons situation. One route to overcoming the anti-commons tragedy is to punish individual 
defection, M Heller, ‘The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets’, 
The William Davidson Institute, Working  
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may occur either ex ante or ex post.  In a world of increased fragmentation and fluidity of 
property rights it is very difficult to devise a one-size-fits-all property rights regime that 
would be appropriate in all cases. A possible solution would be to give the parties 
involved a choice to opt for a property rights regime that better fits their anticipated 
individual incentive structures – re-pricing their property rights ex ante. Ex post re-
pricing is more problematic. A market based solution may itself be subject to strategic 
bargaining and hold ups. State intervention may be inadequate due to information 
deficits, political capture, administrative complexities and the cost of compensation.65 
The anti-commons situation, caused by collectivisation, could further be overcome be 
switching from collectivisation to privatisation (and possibly vice versa) depending on 
the respective situation the debtor and the creditors find themselves in.66 Again, this 
                                                                                                                                                 
Under these circumstances cooperation is the dominant strategy for each creditor. The Nash equilibrium 
coincides with the socially optimal outcome represented by the bottom right corner. However, in practical 
terms this solution may be difficult to implement. It will be difficult to decide ex ante whether there is a 
going concern surplus inherent in the common pool. If not, cooperation (through prolonged negotiation) 
would itself be a waste of time and resources. It may also be difficult to decide whether any one creditor is 
a non-cooperating creditor liable to the 50% tax. This is to a large extent due to the valuation problem: it 
will be difficult to determine the value of the common pool and a potential going concern surplus. This 
makes it difficult to decide whether a particular creditor is holding out and demands more than would be 
due to him on a pro rata basis. 
65 Heller (n 36) 679. 
66 See also D Skeel, ‘Competing Narratives in Corporate Bankruptcy: Debtor in Control vs. No Time To 
Spare’ (2009) 4 Michigan State Law Review 1187, 1203: ‘[T]he coexistence of several possible narratives 
could assure a closer correspondence between the narrative and the underlying facts in any given case.’  
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switch could be market based or state imposed with the respective attendant problems. 
Finally, it may be possible to insulate the participants who are willing to cooperate from 
the defectors in order to allow the co-operators to generate some surplus from (part of) 
the common pool albeit not realising its full potential. In order to prevent negative 
externalities, mandatory rules would have to ensure that partial cooperation is only 
allowed to the extent that co-operators do not encroach on the property rights of 
defectors. An example is the subordination of debt. The agreement between creditors to 
the effect that the subordinated creditor cannot collect from the debtor until the senior 
creditor has been paid in full is valid and enforceable in the debtor’s insolvency because 
the subordination does not affect the rights of the remaining creditors.67 It may also be 
possible to release one or more creditors from the grip of the anti-commons situation, 
again provided this does not interfere adversely with the remaining creditors’ property 
rights. This may be viewed as a form of partial privatisation or a partial opt-out of the 
insolvency process. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Skeel’s ‘No Time to Spare’ narrative is roughly equivalent to ‘privatisation’, whereas ‘Debtor in Control’ 
represents the collectivisation alternative. 
67 Re Maxwell Communications Corp (No 2) [1993] BCC 369, 377 per Vinolett J; Re SSSL Realisations 
(2002) Ltd [2005] [2004] EWHC 1760 (Ch) [45] per Lloyd J; Re Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander Ltd 
[2010] EWCH 316 (Ch) [10] per Blair J. Consider a debtor D with distributable assets worth 180 and three 
creditors A, B and C with claims of nominal 50, 50 and 100, respectively. If B and C agree that B’s claim 
shall be subordinated to C’s this will have no effect on A’s entitlement. In the absence of subordination, A 
and B would be entitled to 25% of the distributable proceeds each (45) and C to the remaining 50% (90). 
With subordination, C’s dividend increases to 100 whereas B’s is reduced to 35. A’s dividend of 45 does 
not change.  
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Corporate insolvency law as mandatory law is justified as a response to certain 
market failures in form of commons and anti-commons problems. However, in view of 
market developments and innovation mandatory corporate insolvency law may, in certain 
situations, aggravate the problems it is meant to address. Where this is the case, 
mandatory law should make room for market based solutions, facilitate them and ensure 
that the entitlements of non-participating parties are not unjustifiably interfered with. This 
requires the striking of a new optimal balance between mandatory provisions and default 
rules, a balance that may change over time with the development of new lending 
practices and financial products. The financial innovation and market developments of 
the last decades necessitate the adequate recalibration of the relationship between 
mandatory law and contract, between state intervention and market-based solutions. Such 
a recalibration is already under way and its different manifestations may be 
conceptualised in accordance with the models developed in the course of the vigorous 
‘contractualisation of bankruptcy’ debate unfolding in the United States over the last 20 
years, challenging, and trying to re-define, the traditional relationship of mandatory 
corporate insolvency law and contract. 68  These different models correspond to the 
                                                 
68 B Adler, ‘Finance’s Theoretical Divide and the Proper Role of Insolvency Rules’ (1994_) 67 Southern 
California Law Review 1107; B Adler, ‘Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate 
Bankruptcy’ (1993) 45 Stanford law Review 311; B Adler, ‘A Theory of Corporate Insolvency’ (1997) 72 
New York University law Review 343; B Adler, ‘A World without Debt’ (1994) 72 Washington University 
Law Quarterly 811; M Bradley and M Rosenzweig . ‘The Untenable Case for Chapter 11’ (1992) 101 Yale 
Law Journal 1043; R Rasmussen, ‘Debtor’s Choice: ‘A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy’ (1992) 
71 Texas Law Review 51; R Rasmussen, ‘A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies’ (1997) 19 
Michigan Journal of International Law 1; R Rasmussen. ‘Empirically Bankrupt’ (2007) Columbia Business 
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commons/anti-commons solutions discussed above as well as to current developments in 
European and domestic corporate insolvency law. 
 
C. MENU APPROACH 
 
As a possible solution to the anti-commons problem, ex ante and ex post re-pricing of 
property rights could be achieved on the basis of a ‘menu approach’ to bankruptcy. 
According to Rasmussen’s ‘menu approach’, bankruptcy law is simply an implied term 
of the contract between a firm and those who extend credit to it. 69  The applicable 
bankruptcy law determines the payment that the lender will receive when the firm is in 
general default. Consequently, the lender will factor it into its lending decision. The 
interest rate will depend on the quality of the applicable bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy law 
is no different from general commercial law, its mandatory nature an anomaly requiring 
                                                                                                                                                 
Law Review 179; A Schwartz, ‘A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy’ (1998) 107 Yale 
Law Journal 1807; A Schwartz, ‘Bankruptcy Contracting Reviewed’ (1999) 109 Yale Law Journal 343; A 
Schwartz, ‘A Normative Theory of Business Bankruptcy’ (2005) 91 Virginia law Review 1199; S 
Schwarcz, ‘Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm’ (1999) 77 Texas Law Review 515; 
M Tracht, ‘Contractual Bankruptcy Waivers: Reconciling Theory, Practice and Law’ (1997) 82 Cornell 
Law Review 301. Opponents: L LoPucki, ‘Contract Bankruptcy: A Reply to Alan Schwartz’ (1999) 109 
Yale Law Journal 317; L LoPucki, ‘Bankruptcy Contracting revised: A Reply to Alan Schwartz’s New 
Model’ (1999) 109 Yale Law Journal 365; S Block-Lieb, ‘The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy’ 
(2001) University of Illinois Law Review 503; J Westbrook, ‘The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy’ (2004) 
82 Texas Law Review 795; E Warren and J Westbrook, ‘Contracting out of bankruptcy: An Empirical 
Intervention’ (2005) 118 Harvard Law Review 1197. 
69 Rasmussen (1992) (n 68) 56. 
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justification. 70  According to Rasmussen, it cannot be justified with reference to the 
common pool problem that arises where creditors are left with their individual 
enforcement remedies. This is because the costs of such an inefficient race among 
creditors would ultimately be borne by the equity holders in form of higher interest rates, 
and the equity holders are best placed to select the rule that provides for the largest 
expected return. 71  The further arguments for mandatory bankruptcy – need for 
standardization and limitation of strategic behaviour – are addressed by making available 
a ‘menu of bankruptcy options’. Upon formation, the firm would be required to select one 
option from the menu (or devise its own bankruptcy contract) in its corporate charter.  
The firm’s creditors would, thus, be on notice of the applicable bankruptcy law.72 The 
problem of strategic manipulation requires that the firm’s ability of changing its initial 
selection after it has incurred debt must be restricted. In general, such a change would 
require consent of all creditors. However, a change that would not result in a transfer of 
wealth from creditors to shareholders/managers would be possible without creditors’ 
consent. This would be the case, under Rasmussen’s model, when a debtor changes from 
Chapter 11 to Chapter 7, thus giving up equity holder protection for the benefit of 
creditors.73  Moreover, non-consensual creditors require protection through mandatory 
provisions unalterable by contract. Rasmussen does not discuss in what form this 
protection should be provided; he merely refers to the literature on unlimited liability of 
shareholders and/or directors for tort claims, or priority for tort (and possibly other non-
                                                 
70 ibid 63. 
71 ibid 64. 
72 ibid 66. 
73 ibid 116-118. 
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consensual, in particular tax) claims, respectively.74 In a later paper Rasmussen extended 
this approach to international insolvency.75 
Rasmussen’s rejection of the common pool analysis is not entirely convincing. It 
rests on the premise that debtors and creditors can either avoid the common pool problem 
altogether by structuring the allocation of rights accordingly, or at least minimise it 
through compensating creditors ex ante for their expected losses.76 The former can be 
achieved by owing a single secured creditor more than the firm would be worth;77 or by 
having only one creditor; or by having only equity investors and no creditors at all. 
Obviously, corporate insolvency law has no role to play where the parties can work out 
the debtor’s difficulties prior to actual insolvency which is more likely where there is 
only one creditor, secured or unsecured. And without any creditors the firm cannot even 
be insolvent. The common pool problem arises where these options are not available for 
whatever reason, resulting in a multitude of different creditors with their own agendas. It 
is also difficult to see how the notion of ex ante compensation can overcome the common 
pool problem. If we return to our two creditors in the example n 40 and assume that their 
respective claims of nominal 7 contain the (promised) optimal ex ante compensation in 
form of an appropriate interest rate, their decision-making patterns would not change and 
in terms of social welfare it would still be wasteful to not preserve the going concern 
value, if any. As a consequence of this lack of engagement, the ‘menu approach’ has little 
                                                 
74 ibid 67 with n 52. 
75 Rasmussen (1997) (n 68). 
76 Rasmussen (1992) (n 68) 64-65; R Picker, ‘Security Interests, Misbehaviour, and Common Pools’ (1992) 
50 University of Chicago Law Review 645, 647-648. 
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to say on the commons problem. It is however significant in terms of the anti-commons 
problem. The ‘menu approach’ increases choice and allows the parties to opt ex ante for 
the optimal definition and pricing of property rights so as to make subsequent 
cooperation more likely. Provided non-adjusting creditors are adequately protected by 
mandatory law, there seems to be no valid justification for denying parties that choice. 
Mandatory corporate insolvency law should not be an end in itself; where its application 
is counterproductive in terms of the objectives it seeks to achieve, parties should be able 
to rely on market-based solutions. Ex post re-pricing is more difficult however, and 
possible under the ‘menu approach’ only where unjustified wealth transfers from debt to 
equity are excluded; or otherwise consent of all creditors is required. However, it does 
not seem to be impossible to device a mechanism that could address these difficulties. 
Ex ante re-pricing in line with the ‘menu approach’ is currently possible to some 
extent pursuant to Arts 3 and 4 of the EU Insolvency Regulation.78 By establishing its 
Centre of Main Interest (COMI) in a Member State, a firm can choose the corporate 
insolvency law of that Member State as the applicable insolvency law and as an implied 
contract term in the contracts with its lenders. The different insolvency laws of the 
Member States constitute the different pricing options on the menu a firm can choose 
from. This was even recognised in the Virgos/Schmit Report.79 The strong presumption 
                                                 
78 Regulation (EC) 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings OJ 2000 L160/1. 
79  When it says that ‘[i]nsolvency is a foreseeable risk. It is therefore important that international 
jurisdiction (…) be based on a place known to the debtor’s potential creditors. This enables the legal risks 
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in favour of the registered office,80 to be determined in a company’s statutes, and the 
‘objective and ascertainable’ criterion 81  addresses the problem of giving notice to 
creditors. However, the fact-sensitivity of COMI82 introduces considerable uncertainty as 
demonstrated by the case law on this question.83 This is a considerable deviation from the 
‘menu approach’. Effective re-pricing is questionable if the parties cannot be sure that 
their selection of a pricing option from the menu will stick. The EUIR is currently under 
review and a number of proposals as regards the COMI concept are on the table.84 
Ex post re-pricing on the basis of the ‘menu approach’ is problematic under the 
current regime. Because of the diversity of national insolvency laws on the menu, it 
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would be difficult to distinguish situations where the transfer of COMI may not result in 
a wealth transfer from creditors to shareholder/managers or between different classes of 
creditors, from those where it might. However, under the current regime, a transfer of 
COMI, and amendment of the applicable insolvency law regime, is possible.85 However, 
the protection of creditors’ legitimate expectations seems to be somewhat sketchy at 
present and dependent upon applicable national law and the mechanism employed for the 
COMI transfer. Where, as in Hellas,86 the transferring entity is a limited partnership-type 
entity and the transfer is effectuated by substitution of the managing general partner with 
a newly formed company with its COMI in the Member State of destination, no effective 
protection may exist. Whereas the former general partner will remain liable for the 
entity’s accrued debt, as will be the new general partner, this liability may be meaningless 
if both are judgment-proof corporate entities. There is further the possibility of initiating 
‘secondary proceedings’87 or ‘territorial proceedings’88 under the bankruptcy law of the 
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creditor if the debtor has an establishment89 in that country. However, protection will be 
effective only where the debtor has realisable assets in the country of the territorial 
proceedings and where the establishment is not judgement proof.90 Alternatively, lenders 
may seek to incorporate into their debt covenants a representation of the borrower as to 
where COMI is situated and an undertaking not to move COMI, as is often done in 
structured transactions. However, even if breach is defined as an event of default 
triggering the usual remedies of debt acceleration and enforcement of security interests, 
such a clause will have only limited effect and cannot prevent an actual transfer of 
COMI. Only a substantially secured creditor or group of creditors will effectively be able 
to prevent a transfer;91 albeit in practice major creditors will almost always be consulted 
and the transfer will not go ahead without their approval.92 Consequently, whereas some 
(less significant) creditors may have no say in a potential ex post re-pricing at all, others 
may be able to opportunistically veto a beneficial transfer of COMI that would allow the 
going concern value to be preserved for the benefit of all parties concerned. Currently, 
there is no framework aimed at overcoming this anti-commons problem. Thus, under 
                                                                                                                                                 
88 Art. 3(4) EUIR. Case C-112/10 Zaza Retail BV, 17 November 2011, nyr. 
89 Interdil (n 80) 62-64 for a definition of the term ‘establishment’. 
90 Directive 2008/94/EC (of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 on the 
protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer, OJ EU 2008 L283/36) provides 
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91 Goode (n 2) para 15-58. 
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current law two inefficiencies creep in: ex ante re-pricing is difficult because of the fact-
sensitive nature of COMI; ex post re-pricing is problematic because of the sketchy regime 
of creditor protection and the absence of a mechanism to address the ensuing anti-
commons problem. 
In the current review of the EUIR, one focus is the concept of COMI. The recent 
Commission Proposal93 by-and-large adopts the approach advocated by INSOL Europe. 
94 The presumption that the COMI is the place of the registered office appears to be 
significantly strengthened. Only exceptionally where the company’s central 
administration is located in a Member State other than the place of the registered office 
and a comprehensive assessment of all the relevant factors establishes, in a manner that is 
ascertainable by third parties, that the company’s actual centre of management and 
supervision and of the management of its interests is located in that other Member State 
will that Member State be the COMI. This is largely a reference to the existing case law95 
with its multitude of different factors to be taken into account, including location of 
strategic, financial and operational management, cash management and pooling, 
recruitment, IT, branding etc.96 Indeed, the COMI may even be situated in a jurisdiction 
other than that of the operational head office functions and the registered office.97 On that 
basis the Proposal seems to achieve only a marginal improvement on the status quo. The 
Commission Proposal seeks to tackle ‘abusive’ forum shopping by providing an 
                                                 
93 Commission Proposal (n 6), Art 1(11) introducing a new Recital (13a); and (22) amending Art 3.  
94 INSOL Europe (n 84) 29, Art 2(a). 
95 Commission Proposal (n 6), Explanatory Memorandum 3.1.2. 
96 INSOL Europe (n 84) 32 para 2.3 – 2.4. 
97 ibid 33 para 2.5. 
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enhanced procedural framework for opening procedures with ex officio assessment of 
jurisdiction by the court and a right for all foreign creditors to challenge the opening 
decision.98 Only the INSOL Europe proposal addresses the ex post re-pricing problem 
directly.99 If the COMI is moved from one Member State (A) to another Member State 
(B) and a request for opening insolvency proceedings is lodged within one year of the 
move of COMI then only the courts of Member State A shall have jurisdiction to open 
insolvency proceedings provided the debtor has left unpaid liabilities caused when COMI 
was in Member State A. In that case Member State B will have jurisdiction only if all 
creditors of these unpaid liabilities have agreed in writing to the transfer of COMI; or the 
debtor company has moved its registered office to Member State B more than one year 
prior to the request for opening proceedings.100 This is a significant improvement on the 
status quo as it provides some clarity in terms of creditor protection. However, it does not 
go far enough restricting its scope arbitrarily to those creditors whose claims came about 
within one year prior to the move of COMI. On the other hand, the proposal not only 
does not address the anti-commons problem; in fact, giving all the creditors falling within 
the one-year-period a veto significantly exacerbates the anti-commons problem. Indeed, 
one could imagine a case where only one creditor falls into the one-year-period who 
could then opportunistically veto a change in COMI that is beneficial to and supported by 
all other creditors. 
                                                 
98 Commission Proposal (n 6), Art 1(23) introducing a new Art 3b. 
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The most clear-cut solution in terms of ex ante re-pricing in line with the ‘menu 
approach’ would be a pure ‘registered office’ solution for COMI.101 If COMI were tied to 
the place of the registered office it would be readily ascertainable by third parties even 
where business is conducted in more than one state.102 Under the right to freedom of 
establishment (Art 49, 54 TFEU), 103  a firm would, upon formation, have complete 
freedom to choose from the European corporate and insolvency law menu. 104  Any 
distortions arising from the application of the corporate law of one Member State and the 
insolvency law of another to the same entity would be eliminated.105 This solution would 
be in line with the ‘menu approach’ and facilitate effective ex ante re-pricing. Ex post re-
pricing would require reincorporation which is currently possible in a safe and structured 
way only for the European Company (SE) 106  and under the Cross-Border Merger 
Directive.107 Whereas the SE statute requires Member States to provide for the adequate 
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protection of creditors in case of a transfer of seat,108 the Cross-Border Merger Directive 
refers to the law of Member States in this respect,109 which in turn must comply with the 
Third Company Directive on Mergers.110 In this respect, national law has to provide for 
an adequate system of safeguards for creditors whose claims have arisen prior to 
publication of the draft terms of merger and not yet fallen due. Creditors whose claims 
have fallen due by then are not protected but can immediately enforce their claims. As a 
minimum standard, national law must provide that a creditor has a right to request 
additional security provided that they can credibly demonstrate that due to the merger the 
satisfaction of their claim is at stake’.111 This system is unsatisfactory because protection 
does not extend to all creditors whilst on the other hand allowing major and secured 
creditors to effectively block reincorporation. 
Following the Court’s decision in Cartesio 112  there is renewed interest in 
legislative intervention at European level in respect of a transfer of a company’s 
                                                 
108 Art 8(7) of Regulation (EC) 2157/2001 of 10 August 2001, on the Statute for a European Company 
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registered office/head office.113 If COMI were tied to the place of the registered office 
such an instrument should also address the ex post re-pricing problem. Obviously, as long 
as creditors are paid as and when their claims fall due, there is no reason to give them a 
say in a company’s decision to transfer its seat (although in practice the major creditors 
will be consulted). This changes however when the company is in financial distress. One 
possible mechanism to deal with this distinction could be making a transfer of seat 
dependent on the company’s directors issuing a solvency statement certifying that the 
company will be able to pay its debts as they fall due for at least the current and the 
following financial year, backed by personal liability of the issuing directors. Where the 
directors do not issue a solvency statement because the transfer of seat is carried out in 
order to restructure under a more favourable insolvency law, all creditors whose claims 
would be impaired by the move should have a say, without, however, being able to veto 
the change in COMI. This could be achieved through a voting mechanism where 
creditors are divided into, and vote in, different classes in accordance with their 
respective property rights under the applicable insolvency law of the Member State of 
origin. The COMI change would then be carried out only where a majority of classes 
approve, with majority voting also within the separate classes. This could be combined 
with substantive safeguards, such as a version of the absolute priority rule. The change in 
COMI may be ‘crammed down’ on a dissenting class only if this class would have at 
least the same priority under the law of the new COMI and no previously junior class 
                                                 
113 Council of the European Union, ‘The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and 
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would obtain under the new COMI priority higher than that of the dissenting class. Such 
a regime could provide the basis for addressing both ex ante and ex post re-pricing in a 
more efficient and effective way.  
However, the problems highlighted above arising from increased debt 
fragmentation and complexity would also affect the suggested voting regime for the 
transfer of COMI. Consequently, ex post re-pricing may fail. It is this problem for which 
the ‘bankruptcy contract approach’ may provide a solution. 
 
D. BANKRUPTCY CONTRACT APPROACH 
 
In a series of papers, Alan Schwartz seeks to improve on the ‘menu approach’.114 The 
optimal procedure in a given case is parameter-specific depending on the borrower’s 
ability to carry out its projects and the type of projects it is expected to have.115 This 
‘state dependency’ and ‘asset specificity’ of the optimal procedure means that an initial 
choice of the applicable regime in the charter may no longer be optimal when the 
company is in financial distress. Charter amendments (ex post re-pricing) are 
cumbersome and may be too slow to enable parties to opt for the optimal regime. The 
solution is to contract ex ante in the lending agreement for the firm to make the optimal 
bankruptcy choice ex post when in financial distress. This can be accomplished by 
‘bribing’ the firm to make that optimal choice by allowing it to keep an optimal 
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percentage of the firm’s insolvency monetary return.116 Two problems are immediately 
obvious: due to ‘state dependence’, the optimal procedure and, thus, the optimal bribe 
may vary over time; and the firm will contract at different times with different creditors 
whose interests may vary and possibly collide. The ‘state dependency’ problem is 
addressed by inserting into the bankruptcy contracts conversion clauses to the effect that 
an earlier contract will automatically convert to a new bargain made at a later stage.117 
Conflicts among creditors’ interests are resolved on the basis of what the ‘ex ante 
majority’ of creditors in terms of value of their claims selected in bankruptcy contracts.118 
One problem that remains is the issue of notice. How does a new creditor know which 
bankruptcy regime currently applies and how can existing creditors be made aware when 
the bankruptcy system subsequently changes? The answer could be a system for the 
registration of bankruptcy contracts. Realistically, only a firm’s major lenders will spend 
time and effort to ascertain and negotiate the optimal bankruptcy system. Only these 
bankruptcy contracts would be registered with the last in time being determinative. Under 
this system there is room for mandatory provisions in respect of ‘structural rules’ that 
protect the integrity of the system itself, such as the automatic stay.119 Moreover, non-
adjusting creditors would be protected by mandatory regulation where necessary. 120 
Through the lens of the commons/anti-commons analysis, this approach can neatly 
explain and justify a switch from collectivisation to privatization. The applicable 
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bankruptcy bargain will be determined, in the end, by a certain lead creditor or group of 
creditors that can, in cooperation with the debtor, effectively control the bankruptcy 
process.121 These are likely to be senior secured creditors with a substantial security 
interest on the debtor firm’s assets, possibly after the injection of new funds that are vital 
for the firm’s continued existence as a going concern.122 The registration requirements for 
the respective security interests as new bankruptcy contracts would put existing and 
future creditors on notice that the bankruptcy bargain has changed. 
The main criticism of the ‘bankruptcy contract approach’ rests on two pillars. 
First, there is a danger of inefficiencies resulting from a redistribution of wealth from 
non-adjusting creditors to lead creditors and debtor where non-adjusting creditors are 
inadequately protected by mandatory law.123 Secondly, it is argued that a secured lead 
creditor has insufficient incentives to obtain the best result possible in administering the 
bankruptcy process. This is because his efforts to realize the value of collateral will be 
limited by the value of his claim. 124  Empirically, this criticism is supported by the 
abolition, subject to certain exceptions,125 of administrative receivership in Britain.126 
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One of the main reasons was the disincentive for the administrative receiver to maximize 
the value of the debtor company’s assets beyond the nominal value of the appointing 
creditor’s claim. 127  The abolition of administrative receivership as an essentially 
contractual enforcement regime was seen as ‘a devastating commentary on the social 
value’ of the privatisation of corporate insolvency.128 
However, market-based privatisation of the corporate insolvency and 
restructuring process seems to have made a powerful reappearance in form of the so-
called pre-packaged administration.129 A pre-packaged administration is an ‘arrangement 
under which the sale of all or part of a company’s business or assets is negotiated with a 
purchaser prior to the appointment of an administrator, and the administrator effects the 
sale immediately on, or shortly after, his appointment.’130 The company’s business will 
frequently be sold to someone connected with the company, 131  often the incumbent 
management team as the only buyer on the scene. The business survives relatively intact, 
having shed some or all of its unsecured debt. Pre-Enterprise Act 2002 it was held in Re 
                                                                                                                                                 
126 By Enterprise Act 2002. 
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T&D Industries plc132 per Neuberger J. (as he then was) that an administrator could 
dispose of the assets of the company without the leave of the court and prior to the 
approval of his proposals by the company’s creditors. In Transbus International Ltd (in 
liquidation), 133 it was confirmed in respect of the post-Enterprise Act 2002 legislation 
that administrators are permitted to sell the assets of the company in advance of their 
proposals being approved by creditors. In DKLL Solicitors v Revenue and Customs 
Commissioners,134 it was held that even a majority creditor does not have a veto on the 
implementation of the administrator’s proposals.135 By contrast, a pre-pack necessarily 
requires the consent of the secured creditors.136 Assets subject to fixed charges and other 
asset-based lending techniques may be sold by the administrator only with either the 
consent of the creditor or by order of the court;137 the latter would significantly delay the 
process. The holder of a qualifying floating charge138 will participate by either appointing 
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the administrator or by not interfering with the company’s appointment.139 According to 
Armour, the rise in pre-packaged administrations can be readily explained by the trend 
towards increased fragmentation of debt. 140  In accordance with the commons/anti-
commons analysis, pre-packs constitute a move from collectivisation to privatisation. The 
consent of unsecured creditors is no longer required. Although they retain their 
substantive entitlements, their procedural rights are severely restricted. The restructuring 
deal to preserve a potential going concern surplus is struck between the debtor company 
and its secured creditors as a class, and possibly with old or new financiers to inject fresh 
capital.141 
There are serious concerns with pre-packs 142  that mirror to some extent the 
privatisation of bankruptcy debate: 143  a pre-packaged business often has not been 
exposed to the competitive forces of the market and may be sold for a consideration 
below market value. There seems to be no incentive to negotiate a consideration that goes 
beyond the amount necessary to discharge the secured indebtedness and the practitioners’ 
fees and expenses. The rights of stakeholders to participate in the decision making 
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process are marginal at best. Unlike in the US under a Chapter 11 pre-pack, the general 
creditors will not be asked to approve the proposal.144 Whereas in the US a pre-packaged 
plan under Chapter 11 requires confirmation by the court, court involvement in a pre-
packed administration is minimal.145 Where the administrator is appointed by the court, 
he may seek directions from the court on the pre-packaged sale immediately following 
the appointment. Otherwise the conduct of the administrator will only be scrutinised by 
the court if challenged ex post on the basis that the interests of a creditor or member have 
been harmed unfairly146 or that the administrator has breached his fiduciary or other 
duties.147 And courts will normally not interfere with the administrators’ commercial 
judgements provided that they are made in good faith and will normally allow a 
considerable margin of discretion.148 
These features make it more likely that inefficient wealth transfers from non-
adjusting creditors to shareholders/managers and lead creditors may occur, in particular 
when the latter two collude. Initial empirical evidence seemed to support this 
conclusion.149 More recent data suggests, however, that pre-packs may well be beneficial 
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for unsecured creditors as well. In her most recent data analysis,150 Sandra Frisby found 
an overall average return to secured creditors of 35% in pre-packs compared to 33% in 
other business sales. Moreover, unsecured creditors received an overall average return of 
5% in pre-packs, but only 4% in other business sales. 2% of pre-packs resulted in full 
return to unsecured creditors, as compared to 1% in business sale cases. The overall value 
enhancing effect may stem from the fact that with a pre-pack the business can be sold 
quickly, thus minimizing the adverse impact of public knowledge of insolvency and the 
restrictions of the insolvency process. 151  There will be continuity of contracts with 
customers and suppliers; and employees, as non-adjusting creditors, are more likely to be 
retained. Indeed, empirical research shows that in 92% of pre-packs 100% of the jobs in 
an insolvent company were saved as compared to 65% in other business sales. Armour 
has rightly pointed out that these results should be treated with caution as they are based 
on comparison of means only without any statistical tests. They do not take into account 
firm size, capital structure or other differences that may affect outcomes.152 However, a 
recent empirical study by Polo also finds no evidence for inefficient wealth transfers from 
unsecured creditors to secured lead creditors. Pre-packs in the form of connected party 
transactions seem to be used to preserve going concern value where intangibles, 
reputation and employees are particularly significant for the business. The recovery rate 
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and re-filing rate is no worse than in alternative procedures.153 In short, pre-packs seem to 
significantly reduce the bankruptcy costs for the benefit of all parties concerned, 
including the debtor. That the debtor participates in the going concern surplus154 is in line 
with the ‘bankruptcy contract approach’ and constitutes the ‘bribe’155 that is necessary to 
commit the debtor to cooperate. In the absence of any evidence for inefficient wealth 
transfers to the detriment of unsecured and non-adjusting creditors, there is no 
justification for mandatory corporate insolvency law to interfere with these market-based 
solutions.156 The role of regulation is rightly limited to providing the legal framework – 
structural rules – within which these market-based solutions can flourish, such as the 
comprehensive moratorium and the administrator’s powers of sale.  
This leaves the issue of a possible switch (back) from privatisation to 
collectivisation. Here, the proposed restructuring moratorium – as the necessary set of 
structural rules – could hold the key. The restructuring moratorium, as envisaged by the 
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Insolvency Service,157 would provide a ‘breathing space’ for larger companies158 during 
which a restructuring deal, in form of an informal workout, a company voluntary 
arrangement or a scheme of arrangement, could be negotiated whilst the incumbent 
management remains in control of the company.159 The restructuring moratorium may 
become relevant for allowing a move from privatisation to collectivisation. This is 
because the moratorium (and the interim moratorium) would prevent the appointment of 
an administrator by the directors or by the holder of a qualifying floating charge, the 
appointment of an administrative receiver, or the application for an administration 
order.160 At the same time, the court hearing required to sanction the moratorium would 
give all creditors an opportunity to represent their interests and to raise objections if they 
felt unfairly prejudiced.161 Moreover, debts incurred during the moratorium could be 
given super-priority status in an immediately following administration or liquidation 
where in terms of priority they would be below any fixed charge on the company’s assets, 
but above the claims of preferential creditors and (qualifying) floating charge holders.162 
The point is, even where the company’s assets are subject to a qualifying floating charge, 
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the privatisation scenario of administration with the floating charge holder in the driving 
seat would no longer be a foregone conclusion. Rather, the restructuring moratorium 
opens up a negotiation space allowing for the participation of all creditors and giving the 
court wide discretion. Moreover, the super-priority facility allows for the replacement of 
an existing bankruptcy contract in the form of privatisation on the basis of a qualifying 
floating charge, with a new bankruptcy contract potentially better suited to preserve the 
going concern surplus. Debtor opportunism has to be kept in check through appropriate 
safeguards.163 However, the restructuring moratorium increases the choice for parties 
faced with ever increasing complexity and allows them to adapt their arrangements to 
changing circumstances. Consequently, the work on the proposal should be continued 
with a view to adopting it as soon as possible.164 
 
E. BANKRUPTCY WAIVERS 
 
Where both a comprehensive ex ante and ex post re-pricing as well as a switch from 
collectivisation to privatisation (or vice versa) fail, it may be possible to allow at least 
some participants to cooperate. Such cooperation may take place within the anti-
commons situation, as in the case of contractual debt subordination.165 More problematic 
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is the question whether the debtor may cooperate with a creditor or a group of creditors 
resulting in partial privatisation and a partial opt-out of these creditors from the anti-
commons situation and general insolvency law principles. This issue has been discussed 
extensively in the context of so-called waiver contracts. 166  Steven Schwarcz’s 
‘bankruptcy waiver approach’ offers an interesting normative theory for ascertaining the 
extent to which parties should be free to contractually override provisions of the statutory 
bankruptcy scheme through waiver contracts. 167  According to Schwarcz, statutory 
provisions may be mandatory, under general principles of contract law, if they either 
pursue a paternalistic agenda or seek to prevent negative externalities. The former is ruled 
out as justification in the context of sophisticated contracting parties.168  By contrast, 
externalities could well justify imposing mandatory bankruptcy rules. Waiver contracts 
may often harm non-consenting parties. For instance, waiving the automatic stay and 
allowing a creditor to seize debtor assets necessary for running the debtor’s business may 
destroy the going concern value of the business and reduce the amount available for 
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distribution. 169  Those contracts that materially reduce the amounts available for 
distribution to creditors are identified as having ‘a secondary material impact.’ From the 
point of view of externality analysis, such contracts should be unenforceable; whereas 
contracts not having a ‘secondary material impact’ should be enforceable.170 However, in 
order to realise any potential efficiency gains, parties must be able to rely on a waiver 
contract’s enforceability ex ante even if ex post it turns out that the contract has a 
‘secondary material impact’. Thus, an ex ante standard of assessment is required that can 
justify the enforceability of a contract despite ex post externalities.171 The tool to measure 
the quantitative impact of externalities, their materiality, is economic efficiency.172 For 
contracts that are ex ante unlikely to result in significant negative externalities 
(‘secondary material impact’), the number of situations where the sum of the gains for 
debtor and contracting creditor (X+Y) is equal to, or exceed, the aggregate net harm 
caused to non-consenting creditors (Z) would be expected to be greater than the number 
of situations where the reverse is true. In aggregate, the sum of all X+Ys would be 
expected to exceed the sum of all Zs.173 It follows that waiver contracts that are ex ante 
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unlikely to result in a secondary material impact would be Kaldor/Hicks efficient and 
should be enforceable.174  
However, given the lack of moral justification and legitimacy of decisions based 
on Kaldor/Hicks vis-à-vis non-consenting parties,175 Schwarcz relies on the concept of 
‘class Pareto efficiency’.176 ‘A transaction is class Pareto efficient if it is Pareto efficient 
when each class of persons affected by the class of transactions is viewed as a single 
collective person. Therefore class Pareto efficiency exists whenever the overall gains to 
each affected class exceed the losses to such class even if some members of the class lose 
value.’177 A decision based on class Pareto efficiency carries greater legitimacy on the 
basis of freedom of contract: ex ante all affected parties would be able to consent to a 
class Pareto efficient transaction and would want it to be enforceable even if ex post some 
would be harmed.178 This is in line with the commons/anti-commons analysis. Treating 
all unsecured creditors as a class alleviates the problem of debt fragmentation and 
divergent creditor interests. What matters is the class as a whole, thus reducing the risk of 
holdout and strategic behaviour. 
Schwarcz develops a mathematical model on the basis of expected value analysis 
demonstrating that a reduction in the likelihood of bankruptcy as a consequence of a 
waiver contract is likely to benefit unsecured creditors as a class in excess of any harm 
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they may suffer. The model179 compares the expected value of unsecured claims absent 
the waiver contract180 with the expected value of unsecured claims in the presence of the 
waiver contract181 on the basis of conservative estimates in accordance with the limited 
empirical material that is available. The latter expected value is likely to exceed the 
former where the debtor receives something in return – increased liquidity – that reduces 
the likelihood of bankruptcy. This would make non-consenting creditors as a class better 
off and even creditors who are eventually harmed would want these contracts to be 
enforceable from an ex ante point of view. 182  By contrast, the harm arising from 
externalities would begin to outweigh the benefit from increased liquidity when the 
likelihood of a secondary material impact exceeds circa 30%. Such contracts are, from an 
ex ante point of view, likely to cause material negative externalities, are therefore not 
‘class Pareto efficient’ and should not be enforced. In short, a waiver contract for which 
                                                 
179 Based on the assumption that the debtor has one secured creditor who seeks a pre-bankruptcy contract 
waiving the automatic stay, all other creditors are unsecured, ibid 565. 
180 As equal to the ‘likelihood of bankruptcy absent the contract x [nonforeclosure asset value in bankruptcy 
– amount of the secured claim] + the likelihood of avoiding bankruptcy absent the contract x amount of 
unsecured claim (assumes payment in full by avoiding bankruptcy)’; ibid 569 n 300. 
181 As equal to the  ‘likelihood of bankruptcy with the liquidity resulting from the contract x [{chance of an 
unanticipated secondary material impact occurring x value of the unsecured claims if a secondary material 
impact occurs} + {chance that an unanticipated secondary impact will not occur x (asset value assuming no 
secondary material impact – amount of the secured claim)}] + the likelihood of avoiding bankruptcy with 
liquidity resulting from the contract x amount of unsecured claim (assumes payment in full by avoiding 
bankruptcy)’; ibid. 
182 ibid 565-671. 
 50 
the debtor receives reasonably equivalent value183 should be enforceable if, viewed ex 
ante, it is unlikely to result in material negative externalities and does not manifestly 
impair the debtor’s ability to rehabilitate. 184  The weakness of this approach is its 
somewhat simplistic underlying factual assumptions and its dependency on the chosen 
numbers, although Schwarcz seeks to account for that to some extent.185 It nevertheless 
seems to reflect a more general heuristic insight that where a transaction was entered into 
in good faith and with the best interest of the company in mind subsequent invalidation of 
the transaction requires some justification, given that both shareholders and creditors 
invested on the basis of the company’s risk profile and, in the absence of fraud or 
misrepresentation, will have obtained adequate ex ante compensation. This does not 
mean that a common pool problem does no longer exist.186 Rather, enforceability of the 
opt-out or partial privatisation is the price the general creditors should be willing and 
have to pay for a reduction in the probability of insolvency, even if ex post insolvency 
still materialises and actual returns do not meat ex ante expectations. 
Under English law the general principle that parties cannot contract out of the 
insolvency legislation embraces two sub-principles: the pari passu principle and the anti-
deprivation principle.187 The former concerns the distribution of the debtor’s assets in 
                                                 
183 In order to ensure that waiver contracts are valued correctly most waiver contracts should be enforceable 
only if entered into at a time of default, ibid 595. 
184 ibid 584. 
185 ibid 570. 
186 Above text following n 75. 
187 Belmont (n 14) [1] – [15] per Lord Collins; Goode (n 2) para 7-01 – 7-03; S Worthington, ‘Good Faith, 
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accordance with the statutory order of priority. It seeks to ensure that all creditors are 
treated equally on the basis of their pre-insolvency entitlements and that no creditor (or 
class of creditors) obtains preferential treatment. 188  Contravention of the pari passu 
principle has no impact on the company’s balance sheet: assets are exchanged in 
consideration for the extinction of an existing debt. By contrast, pursuant to the anti-
deprivation principle the debtor may not contract at any time, either before or after the 
commencement of insolvency proceedings, for its property to be removed or disposed of 
or dealt with otherwise than in accordance with the statute.189 In principle, the rule seeks 
to prevent a decrease in the debtor company’s net assets available for distribution by 
removing assets that otherwise would have been available for distribution.190 Although 
both principles will overlap where an existing creditor obtains preferential treatment in 
excess of its pre-insolvency entitlement, 191  conceptually there is a clear distinction 
                                                 
188 British Eagle International Airlines Ltd v Compagnie Air France [1975] 1 WLR 758, 780G-H, per Lord 
Cross. 
189 Ex parte Jay (1880) LR 14 ChD per James LJ 25: ‘[A] simple stipulation that upon a man’s becoming 
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between pari passu and anti-deprivation, not always observed by courts in the past.192 In 
terms of the commons/anti-commons analysis, pari passu concerns the pricing of 
creditors’ property rights in the anti-commons situation through a particular order of 
priority. Anti-deprivation concerns the conservation of the insolvent estate; by preventing 
attempts to bypass the collective insolvency regime it seeks to preserve the principle of 
collectivity itself.193 
The exact boundaries of the anti-deprivation rule have escaped easy definition. 
What could be gleaned from the cases was a distinction between interests that were 
granted as limited so as to come to an end, automatically or by way of termination, when 
the company goes into winding up; and absolute interests where a party is given the right 
to recapture the asset upon the debtor’s insolvency. Only the latter was considered to 
offend against the anti-deprivation rule; in the former type of cases the interest never was 
the outright property of the company.194 The distinction has often been criticised as being 
devoid of any clear rationale.195 In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the scope and 
ambit of the anti-deprivation principle has come under scrutiny in the context of complex 
                                                 
192 Look Chan Ho, ‘The principle against divestiture and the pari passu fallacy’ (2010) 25 Butterworths 
Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 3; but now Belmont (n 14) [1] – [15] per Lord Collins; 
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financial arrangements.196 At the heart of the matter is the question to what extent party 
autonomy can prevail in view of the interests of third party creditors. In Belmont the 
Supreme Court attempted to define the boundaries of the anti-deprivation rule and the 
role of party autonomy in the context of corporate insolvency.197 
Belmont concerned legal entitlements to priority in security on the collateral 
provided in a synthetic collateralised debt obligation programme which had been 
established by Lehman Brothers International (Europe). Special purpose vehicles 
incorporated in offshore jurisdictions by Lehman Group issued notes to investors using 
the proceeds to acquire, as collateral, highly rated government bonds and other secure 
investments. The collateral was vested in a Trustee. Each SPV entered into a credit 
default swap with a Delaware entity, Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc (LBSF). 
Under the swap, LBSF would pay the issuer the amounts due by the issuer to the 
noteholders in exchange for sums equal to the yield on the collateral. On maturity of the 
notes (or on early redemption or termination) the amount payable by LBSF to the issuer 
was the initial principal amount subscribed by the investors less amounts calculated by 
reference to credit events during a specified period in respect of one or more reference 
entities. The SPV’s exposure to LBSF under the credit default swap and to the 
noteholders was secured on the collateral. The terms of the arrangement provided that the 
                                                 
196 In addition to Belmont (n 14) see also Lomas (n 192); Folgate London Market Ltd (formerly Towergate 
Stafford Knight Co Ltd) v Chaucer Insurance Plc [2011] EWCA Civ 328; Lehman Brothers Special 
Financing Inc v Carlton Communications Ltd [2011] EWHC 718 (Ch). 
197 Belmont (n 14); see also Perpetual Trustee Company Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd [2009] 
EWHC 1912 (Ch); Butters and others v BBC Worldwide Ltd and others [2009] EWHC 1954 (Ch.); 
Perpetual Trustee Company Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1160. 
 54 
charge over the collateral would become enforceable if any amount due in respect of the 
notes was not paid or delivered when due. Any money the trustee obtained in realisation 
of the collateral had to be applied first with ‘swap counterparty priority’ in favour of 
LBSF unless an event of default had occurred under the swap agreement and the swap 
counter party was the defaulting party, in which case the noteholders would have 
priority.198 LBSF filed for Chapter 11 on 3 October 2008 following its parent company 
which had filed two weeks earlier on 15 September 2008.199 Both filings constituted an 
event of default, triggering the priority flip from swap counter party priority to noteholder 
priority. LBSF argued that the effect was to deprive its estate of property in the event of a 
bankruptcy filing which would otherwise have been available for distribution among the 
creditors.200 
Both High Court and Court of Appeal held that the ‘priority flip’ did not offend 
the anti-deprivation rule. This was confirmed by the Supreme Court. Lord Collins, 
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62.  
200 Perpetual Trustee Company Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd [2009] EWHC 1912 (Ch) para. 
3-6. 
 55 
delivering the majority opinion of the Court,201 tried to establish workable principles for 
the demarcation of the anti-deprivation rule. It was desirable for courts to give, as far as 
possible, effect to contractual terms which the parties have agreed, in particular in the 
context of complex financial instruments. The modern tendency has been to uphold 
commercially justifiable contractual provisions. The policy behind the anti-deprivation 
rule was to prevent parties from depriving the debtor of property which would otherwise 
be available for creditors. The anti-deprivation principle was essentially directed at 
intentional or inevitable evasion of the principle that the debtor’s property is part of the 
insolvent estate. It must be applied in a commercially sensitive manner, upholding proper 
commercial bargains.202 What was decisive in the case at issue was ‘the fact that this was 
a complex commercial transaction entered into in good faith.’203 The provisions were not 
intended to evade insolvency law as was obvious from the wide range of non-insolvency 
circumstances capable of constituting an Event of Default triggering the priority switch.  
                                                 
201 Lord Mance adopted a different approach that led him to the same result. This approach is objective and 
based on the familiar ‘limited (flawed) asset/absolute interest’ dichotomy. His line of argument is twofold: 
prior to the occurrence of an event determining whether counterparty priority or noteholder priority applies, 
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obligations, the performance of each of which is the quid pro quo of the other’ there is nothing 
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provided for it if the other becomes bankrupt [179]. For a critique of this approach Worthington (n 189) 
118-120. 
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Moreover, ‘the substance of the matter [was] that the security was provided by the 
Noteholders and subject to a potential change in priorities.’204 The noteholder priority 
was intended to deal with the risk that LBSF was not in a position to provide sufficient 
funds to the Issuers for them to pay the noteholders. As such, it seems to have been a 
material factor in obtaining Triple A credit ratings which enabled Lehman to market the 
notes.205 According to the Court of Appeal in Lomas, this test must now by accepted as 
an authoritative statement of the anti-deprivation principle. Consequently, in rejection of 
the flawed asset theory, each transaction has to be assessed on its own merits in order to 
distinguish between a commercial re-arrangement of rights to reflect the economic 
consequences of insolvency and an attempt to pre-empt the distribution of assets in a 
bankrupt estate.206 
In addition to doctrinal arguments,207 the Supreme Court’s approach has been 
criticised for its inherent uncertainty. It will often be difficult to determine whether a 
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certain deprivation provision was entered into in good faith or whether there was an 
intention to bypass the collective insolvency procedure. When a company enters into a 
transaction it will more often than not do so on the assumption that it will not become 
insolvent and agree to a deprivation provision in return for some commercial 
advantage,208 possibly in form of a reduction of its costs of credit. In that scenario the 
transaction may well be a ‘proper commercial bargain’. On the other hand, an intention 
may be inferred from the mere presence of a deprivation clause. However, ‘in borderline 
cases a commercially sensible transaction entered into in good faith’ should not be 
invalidated under the anti-deprivation principle.209 It is not clear what would make a case 
‘borderline’. The fact that not all, but only some, deprivation clauses seem to justify an 
inference of intention would suggest that what is really at issue is not intention or good 
faith as such but whether and to what extent there is actually deprivation.210 According to 
Worthington, the reliance on good faith glosses over this essential question. Moreover, if 
the purpose of the anti-deprivation principle is to preserve the estate for the creditors 
collectively it is difficult to see why a transaction that results in a depletion of the 
company’s assets should be upheld simply because this depletion was unintentional.211 
The anti-deprivation rationale does not seem to leave room for good faith or intention. 
This is confirmed by the fact that for an infringement of the pari passu principle the 
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intention of the parties and good faith is immaterial; all that matters is the effect of an 
agreement.212  
It seems possibly to counter these objections on the basis of the ‘waiver contract 
approach.’ The Supreme Court’s reasoning seems to be in accordance with the concept of 
‘class Pareto efficiency’. Whilst keen to give effect to contractual terms so far as 
possible, the Court is mindful of party autonomy being limited by the adverse effect 
contractual arrangements may have on the rights of third parties, 213  in other words 
negative externalities or a ‘secondary material impact’. Under the waiver contract 
approach, contracts that ex ante are unlikely to result in significant negative externalities 
should be enforceable. This finds its expression in Lord Collins’ analysis, that the anti-
deprivation rule should not be applied to bona fide commercial transactions which do not 
have as their predominant purpose, or one of their main purposes, the deprivation of the 
property of one of the parties.214 If a transaction has a proper business purpose it is more 
likely than not that the debtor company receives some benefit in return otherwise it would 
not have contracted. Deprivation not being a predominant purpose makes it less likely 
that a ‘secondary material impact’ will in fact occur. As we have seen, in order to meet 
the ‘class Pareto requirement’, under the bankruptcy contract the debtor must receive 
something in return – reasonably equivalent value – that reduces the likelihood of 
bankruptcy. This requirement is reflected in the notion that the source of the collateral 
may matter. In Lord Walker’s words, ‘the noteholders were, as a matter of substance, the 
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only party who contributed real assets’.215  This and the priority flip seem to have been 
necessary to obtain a high credit rating that was essential for marketing the notes. Thus, 
LBSF and its creditors were able to benefit from the priority flip provision ex ante. 
Sophisticated investors (in LBSF) would have been aware of the widespread use of these 
and similar clauses and would be able to price their investments accordingly so as to 
obtain appropriate ex ante compensation. Consequently, the clause would meet the ‘class 
Pareto efficiency’ test. 
The reliance on good faith and the parties’ intentions is essential in order to allow 
the ex ante assessment of the enforceability of a contract. The subjectivity of the test may 
result in uncertainty in individual cases. However, a ‘bright line approach’ would itself be 
costly. One extreme would be to give parties (almost) free reign.216  This would largely 
bypass the law on secured credit. The extensive use of ‘invisible’ quasi security would be 
likely to significantly decrease any chance of preserving a possible going concern value 
and would render a moratorium futile.217 The other extreme would be a rule similar to the 
US prohibition of ipso facto provisions, as advocated by Professor Sir Roy Goode.218 In 
parallel proceedings in the US, involving different noteholders but not Belmont, Judge 
Peck held that the ‘priority flips’ constituted unenforceable ipso facto clauses violating 11 
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USC §§ 365(e)(1) and 541(c)(1)(B) and that any action to enforce such provisions as a 
result of LBSF’s bankruptcy filing would violate the automatic stay under 11 USC § 
362(a).219 Such general unenforceability would prevent any legitimate contracting, 220 
subject only to certain safe harbour exceptions.221 On the basis of our analysis above, it 
may result in the actual destruction of going concern surplus. Moreover, a clear objective 
test of what transactions offend the anti-deprivation principle has eluded courts and 
commentators for 200 years. Besides, courts are used to making subjective good faith 
assessments all the time, be it in the context of undervalue transactions, preferences, 
transactions defrauding creditors or wrongful trading.222 There is little reason to assume 
that they would not be capable of fleshing out the anti-deprivation principle on the basis 
of the Supreme Court’s test, in particular when enriched with the considerations of the 
waiver contract approach. 
 
F. CONCLUSION 
 
                                                 
219 Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd, 422 BR 407 (US 
Bankruptcy Court, SDNY, 2010). 
220 Cleary (n 199) 431. Cleary’s own test occupies a compromise position between these two extremes, but 
is in substance very similar to the Supreme Court’s, albeit much more complex. 
221 11 USC §§559 – 561 protecting liquidation, termination, acceleration and close-out netting clauses in 
repo and derivative contracts. These are themselves subject to critique, S Lubben, ‘Derivatives and 
Bankruptcy: The Flawed Case for Special Treatment’ (2009) 12 University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
Business Law 61.  
222 Cleary (n 199) 440. 
 61 
The commons/anti-commons analysis explains much of what is going on in corporate 
insolvency law. 223  It justifies the existence of mandatory provisions such as a 
comprehensive automatic stay/moratorium, information rights, majority voting and cram 
down. At the same time it provides the basis for enhanced party autonomy. Financial 
innovation resulting in the fragmentation of debt, ever increasing complexity of 
proprietary rights and distorted incentives of rights holders may render traditional 
mechanisms ineffective. In this respect, commons/anti-commons analysis can be 
combined with ‘contractualisation of bankruptcy’ models in order to redefine the 
boundaries of mandatory law and contract. 
The ‘menu approach’ addresses the anti-commons problem through the ex ante 
and ex post re-pricing of the property rights of those who are locked in a collective 
procedure in order to make cooperation more likely. It finds an expression in the concept 
of the COMI pursuant to Arts 3 and 4 EUIR. COMI should be reformed by adopting a 
pure incorporation/registered office test. Moreover, the issues ensuing from a transfer of 
COMI should be addressed in a future instrument on the transfer of a company’s 
registered office. The ‘bankruptcy contract approach’ offers an analytical tool for 
allowing parties to change from ‘collectivisation’ to ‘privatisation’ and vice versa. The 
former is reflected in the current practice of pre-packaged administrations. Empirical 
evidence suggests that pre-packs are beneficial to all parties concerned, providing a 
strong argument in favour of not restricting party autonomy in this respect. A move from 
‘privatisation’ to ‘collectivisation’ may become possible under the proposed restructuring 
moratorium. The ‘waiver contract approach’ provides a standard for assessing which 
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contractual arrangements overriding insolvency law provisions should be enforceable 
from an ex ante perspective. This approach justifies the Supreme Court’s test for 
identifying transactions that offend the anti-deprivation principle, based on a desire to 
uphold bona fide commercial transactions, whilst at the same time addressing the 
externalities problem. 
In these instances, we can observe a market-driven re-alignment of the boundaries 
between mandatory corporate insolvency law and private ordering. The analytical 
framework developed here, suggests that mandatory corporate insolvency law should not 
be an end in itself. Rather, it is a means for addressing certain market failures in form of 
common pool and anti-commons problems. Where mandatory law fails to achieve its 
objectives and becomes counter-productive, it should make room for market-based 
solutions and should retreat to providing the structural rules necessary to facilitate private 
ordering. This is the underlying theme that connects and justifies the developments 
discussed in this article. 
